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Abstract
The paper investigates the multiple public-private exchanges and cooperation
involved in the installation and development of CCTV surveillance at Geneva
InternationalAirport.Emphasis is placed on the interacting forms of authority and
expertise of five parties: the user(s), owner and supplier of the camera system, as
well as the technical managers of the airport and the Swiss regulatory bodies in
airport security. While placing the issues of airport surveillance in the particular
context of a specific range of projects and transformations relating to the devel-
opments of CCTV at Geneva Airport, the paper not only provides important
insights into the micro-politics of surveillance at Geneva Airport, but aims to
re-institute these as part of a broader ‘problematic’: the mediating role of expertise
and the growing functional fragmentation of authority in contemporary security
governance. On this basis, the paper also exemplifies the growing mutual interde-
pendences between security and business interests in the ever growing ‘surveillant
assemblage’ in contemporary security governance.
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Introduction
As national entrance gates of critical economic and symbolic importance,
international airports are amongst the most iconographic sites of both the
opportunities and the vulnerabilities of globalization (Salter 2008a). Conse-
quently, airport security has been a critical issue for decades, from the first
airplane hijackings in the 1930s and 1940s to the current context of the war on
terror. The history of the airport, thus, is also the history of the security
concerns, discourses and practices related to the aviation sector.
Klauser (Institute of Hazard and Risk Research, Department of Geography, Durham University) (Corresponding author email:
f.r.klauser@durham.ac.uk)
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In recent years, the security issues at airports were not only forcefully
reiterated by a series of dramatic incidents – from the 9/11 attacks to the
alleged London aircraft plot in August 2006 and the 2007 attacks on Glasgow
Airport – but also subjected to repeated academic scrutiny. Echoing the sub-
stantial increase of airport surveillance in the twenty-first century, a growing
literature has sought to examine the modalities and challenges of security
governance in the aviation sector (e.g.Lisle 2003; Salter 2008b) and to critically
reflect upon the wider socio-political implications of the extended and rede-
signed filtering and screening of international mobilities through the airport
(Lyon 2003; Salter 2004; Adey 2004a; Adey 2004b). Adding to this, a growing
body of work has aimed to investigate the increased surveillance of micro-
scale movements and behaviours of airport customers that occur within the
publicly accessible shopping and arrival zones of the airport itself (Fuller 2002;
Adey 2004a; Klauser, Ruegg and November 2008). On this basis, airports have
been characterized not only as detached worlds of flows (Castells 1996) and of
perpetual transit (Fuller 2003), but also as highly monitored places of con-
sumption in their own right.
Yet, despite this increasingly developed body of research, there is still very
little empirical evidence about the everyday surveillance practices and tech-
niques through which passenger flows are screened and profiled at specific
airports. Furthermore, little is known about the actors and interests involved in
the gradual developments and adjustments of these monitoring techniques.
The often rather general tone and research focus of the existing literature on
the securitization and surveillance of ‘the airport’ thus often induces a kind of
distancing from actual existing airports, which tends to further exacerbate the
alleged ‘placelessness’ of the airport. In addition, although the existing litera-
ture has provided important insights into the airport as a multifaceted and
increasingly powerful ‘machine for processing and controlling mobility’ (Fuller
and Harley 2005: 43), in which ‘all movement is controlled, from the planes on
the apron to the corralling of passengers in retail areas’ (Fuller 2002: 133), little
critical attention has been paid to the actual shortcomings and failures of
airport security (Bazerman and Watkins 2005).
Approach
This paper aims to address the important gap of empirical research on security
governance and surveillance issues in the airport environment. More specifi-
cally, it provides an empirically-based examination of the multiple public-
private exchanges and cooperation involved in the setting up and
developments of CCTV surveillance at Geneva International Airport. Thus,
the research approach which is pursued here is to focus on the micro-level,
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locating the issues of airport surveillance in the particular context of a specific
range of projects and transformations relating to the developments of CCTV
at Geneva International Airport.
Conceptually, the paper is rooted in an STS-based line of thinking, as devel-
oped by Bruno Latour and Michel Callon amongst others (e.g. Latour 1987;
Jasanoff et al. 1994; Vinck 1995; Callon and Law 1997; Callon, Lascoumes and
Barthe 2001). Considering CCTV as a dynamic socio-technical construction
which is constantly ‘in the making’, video-surveillance at Geneva Airport will
be studied from the perspective of the processes of bringing the system into
service, i.e. as the subject of constant research and development, requiring a
whole series of micro-negotiations and micro-decisions taken by a large
variety of parties. More particularly, the paper seeks to assess the role of
different forms of ‘expertise’ (expert knowledge) in the distribution of ‘author-
ity’ (the power to act and decide considered legitimate by the involved actors)
in the installation and development of airport CCTV.
This emphasis on the notions of ‘expertise’ and ‘authority’ derives strong
inspiration fromActor-NetworkTheory, and more specifically fromMadeleine
Akrich and Cécile Méadel’s (1999) detailed empirical investigations of the
complex and contingent interactions between the actors, interests and domains
of expertise involved in the planning, installation and development of particu-
lar surveillance systems. Following the proposals of Akrich and Méadel, the
paper starts from the assertion that the planning, setting up and developments
of CCTV at Geneva Airport cannot be explained by referring exclusively to
the formal competences of the relevant airport and police authorities. Rather,
these processes are the product of complex relationships, which are mediated
by the interacting domains of expertise of a wide range of actors, from the
user(s) and owner, to the technical manager and supplier of the system.
Yet, my aim is not only to provide isolated insights into the micro-politics of
surveillance at Geneva Airport, but to re-institute this question as part of a
broader problematic: the mediating role of expertise and the growing func-
tional fragmentation of authority in contemporary security governance. The
installation and developments of CCTV surveillance at Geneva International
Airport will thus be studied as an exemplary illustration of a broader set of
questions:
• What role are different forms of expertise playing in the making of
security governance in the airport context, from the project stage to the
daily uses and further improvement of specific surveillance devices?
• What does the ‘problematic’ of CCTV surveillance at Geneva airport tell
us about the role of expertise in contemporary security governance?
My empirically informed investigation of the mediating role of expertise in
the making of CCTV surveillance at Geneva International Airport thus con-
nects neatly with the growing interdisciplinary literature about the shifting
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modes of governance and authority in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries. This literature, based on the understanding of ‘governance’ in terms
of ‘authority’ rather than jurisdiction (Lipschutz 1999: 260), or, in Ernst-Otto
Czempiel’s words, as the ‘capacity to get things done without the legal com-
petence to command that they be done’ (Czempiel 1992: 250), has sought to
challenge conventional notions of how the state exercises authority in an age
of globalization. Hence, important insights have been gained into the role of
professional experts,whose importance in contemporary modes of governance
both from a general perspective (e.g. Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Czempiel
1992; Roseanau 1997; Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999; Lipschutz 1999; Collins
and Evans 2007) and from a specific security viewpoint (e.g. Dillon and Reid
2001; Amoore and De Goede 2005) cannot be overrated.
However, while the roles and impacts of the new public-private, local-
national-global coalitions of authority in contemporary security governance
have been acknowledged both in general and in the airport context more
specifically, there is a pressing need to better understand the precise manner in
which the various knowledges and practices of security merge (in consensus
and conflict) within a particular micro-milieu, and the ramifications this has.
Focussing on the example of CCTV surveillance at Geneva Airport, the fol-
lowing analysis is searching for answers to precisely this question.
Methodology
The paper draws upon rich empirical insights provided by a two year research
project funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (Ruegg et al. 2006).
Based on two case studies – CCTV in public transport in Geneva and, as
explored in this paper, CCTV at Geneva International Airport – the overall
objective of the project was to examine the complexity of factors that contrib-
ute to the functioning and impact of the ever growing ‘surveillant assemblage’
in contemporary security governance (Haggerty and Ericson 2000). On this
basis, and given the involvement of both social scientists and legal specialists in
the research team, the project also aimed to provide empirically-based insights
into the main regulation challenges in contemporary, security-related ‘techno-
politics’ (Mitchell 2002: 43) and into the potential of legal rules available in
order to regulate the growing use of surveillance technologies for security and
control purposes.
As regards the study of CCTV surveillance at Geneva InternationalAirport
more specifically, eleven open-ended, qualitative interviews with the key
actors, involved in the planning, installation, use and development of the
airport CCTV system were conducted. Facilitated by strong, long-term rela-
tions and established terms of collaboration with political, police and airport
authorities in Geneva, a series of preliminary meetings with senior members of
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police at Geneva InternationalAirport were held in 2003/2004.These meetings
not only served to design and plan the main modalities of field work, but also
to map the main police bodies and airport services involved in the history of
CCTV at Geneva Airport. The key players in the development of CCTV at
Geneva Airport were thus identified in consultation with senior members of
police, and subsequently contacted in a first series of interviews in 2004/2005,
including the current and former heads of airport police, the head of the
airport police control room, two police CCTV operators, as well as represen-
tatives from both the airport’s technical and legal services.The insights gained
into the functioning and history of airport CCTV were further developed in a
second series of interviews. For this purpose, additional parties were identified,
whose roles in the installation and developments of the airport CCTV system
were discovered in the first interview series (including system suppliers as well
as local political authorities and commissions).
Interviews were based on a list of 15 key research topics and issues, which
was submitted to each interviewee before the meeting. Thematically, this list
was divided into three main parts: firstly, the risks and security threats at the
airport, with a specific focus on the publicly accessible airport sections. Sec-
ondly, the objectives and uses of CCTV, as well as the role and integration of
CCTV within the airport security system as a whole. Thirdly, the history of
CCTV at Geneva Airport, focusing especially on the actor networks and
decision-making processes involved in the planning, setting up and further
developments of the camera system.
In addition, the modalities of everyday camera uses at the airport were
studied during one week of observational research in the airport police control
room, a methodological approach which will however not be explored in this
paper. In order to give a strong focus to the paper’s account, my empirical
analysis that follows will be limited to the third thematic emphasis, covered by
the conducted qualitative interviews (for a larger discussion, see Ruegg et al.
2006).
Content
The following analysis is divided into four main parts. The paper starts with a
general discussion of the public–private coalition of interests in the installation
of airport CCTV at Geneva. The following parts succinctly discuss the instal-
lation and development of CCTV at GenevaAirport from the airport police’s
perspective (1), the airport’s management and technical services point of view
(2), as well as from the private CCTV supplier’s perspective (3). In this,
emphasis is placed on the relationships between these parties, as well as on the
interactions between their different forms of authority and expertise. On this
basis, the paper concludes with a more general discussion of the current logics
and problems of public–private interdependences in security governance.
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A local coalition of interests in the installation of airport CCTV
In 1996, the first 13 police cameras were installed in the check-in and arrival
hall at Geneva International Airport. Our interviewees agreed that at this
time, the project was mainly legitimized as a necessary policing measure in the
fight against the rising problem of petty criminality in the airport.
At the time we installed CCTV in the airport’s public premises, a series of
problems of petty criminality were apparent.The police said we neither have
the means to increase human presence nor to install further technical
equipment. Given the fact that the airport management was afraid of
Geneva Airport becoming the meeting space for any sort of petty theft,
negotiations had to set in: ‘If we pay the equipment, would you be ready to
put somebody behind the video screens?’ I’d think that this was much more
a matter of dialogue than an application of strict rules. Eventually, it was
done like this and everybody was happy. (Senior member of technical
service at Geneva Airport)2
What seems to be a minor episode in the account of our interviewee pro-
vides a series of significant insights into the procedures at work in the planning
and setting up of CCTV at Geneva Airport.A key dimension of the emerging
picture is that CCTV at Geneva Airport was born from a strong, locally-
anchored coalition of interests between the police and the airport
management. In our interviews, there was indeed no mention of any national
coordination in the matter of airport CCTV at Geneva. Rather than being
imposed externally, CCTV was developed in a series of internal exchanges and
bottom-up planning processes. This conclusion is further confirmed by a legal
notice dating from 1997, resuming the cantonally – not nationally – established
legal conditions for the use of CCTV at Geneva InternationalAirport (Etat de
Genève 1997).
Yet, although the airport CCTV project was developed from a bottom-up
initiative, the apparent absence of any coordinated, national approach in
airport CCTV surveillance is a fact worth pondering. Interviewees repeatedly
emphasized that since 9/11, security standards at the airport were dramatically
increased and rigidified by the Swiss regulatory body of civil aviation.
The issue [of security] was always present.Yet, it is no secret to say that since
9/11, the position of the regulatory organs has been rigidified. Since 9/11, we
are exposed to increased pressures. Security measures have been dramati-
cally increased in terms of passenger, airport personnel and luggage
controls. (Senior member of technical service at Geneva Airport)
In this light, there is good reason to assert that if CCTV surveillance had not
been developed from the local level, it would have been imposed as a result
of the rising external pressures after 9/11. How exactly these pressures
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materialize in new or re-tooled airport surveillance can be illustrated by the
example of the recently reinforced access control measures for airport
employees at Geneva Airport.
The project of access control was demanded by the Federal Office of Civil
Aviation [FOCA], telling us ‘You must improve your system of internal
control’. Thus, we discussed different possible measures with them and
eventually got our project validated. Clearly, there was also the question
‘What about biometrics?’ [..] The airport had asked the FOCA about this,
saying ‘We do not really want to embark on biometrics now, what do you
think?’ The FOCA then responded ‘Biometrics is not meant to be imposed
at the moment. But be prepared to install it later on’. (Member, technical
service at Geneva Airport).
Going back to the history of CCTV surveillance at Geneva Airport more
specifically, we see that from the initial, locally-anchored negotiations between
the airport authorities and the airport police, a hybrid situation of shared
competences and authority in the CCTV system developed: the police operate
CCTV,while the airport covers all relevant material and installation costs.This
situation has remained unchanged throughout the numerous gradual adapta-
tions and extensions of airport CCTV in recent years: since the first cameras
were installed in 1996, the number of cameras increased to 20 in 2006, technical
features have been extended (e.g. from analogue to digital surveillance) and
old cameras have been re-positioned in order to improve the system’s
performance.
Yet, despite the routinized collaboration between the airport management
and the airport police in the matter of CCTV, the modalities of collaboration
have never been the object of any formalized agreement or explicit legal
notice.The study of the ties, exchanges and cooperation through which CCTV
surveillance at Geneva International Airport has become practically opera-
tional must therefore rely exclusively on the empirical information provided
by the numerous interviews conducted in our research.
Airport police: legal authority and practical expertise in airport security
Amongst other duties, the airport police, an entity of the cantonal police at
Geneva, are commissioned with the ‘the securitization of the airport installa-
tions, official buildings, tarmac, runways, airplanes on the ground and of the
airport territory’ (Etat de Genève 2001:Art 2). Naturally, this mission confers
to the airport police strong legal authority in the installation, use and devel-
opments of the airport CCTV system. In our interviews, the airport police were
indeed unanimously described as the only CCTV operating and using author-
ity at Geneva International Airport.
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Yet, to the police’s legally defined position in connection with airport sur-
veillance, a second source of authority must be added. On the basis of our
interviews, we indeed see that in practice, the police’s authority in the multiple
negotiations and interactions relating to airport CCTV was above all condi-
tioned by their long-term, locally-anchored experiences in airport security. For
example, only the police could accurately decide where to locate and how to
position the cameras in order to cover the most sensible and strategically
important spots in the airport.
One day, we all met with some cameras, a trolley and a screen. Then, we
installed this equipment, looking at the resulting fields of vision of the
cameras. Based on our crime investigation department’s information about
thefts and other offences, we proceeded to do some detailed adjustments, in
order to find exactly those places which corresponded with our needs. We
did this with all cameras and for all places which we had determined before.
(Head, airport police control room)
The previous quote not only highlights the strong impact of the police’s
practical knowledge upon the airport CCTV system. The episode of the
cameras lying on a trolley and being pushed through the airport in search of
the best installation points is indeed of more general value. Capturing one of
the key moments in the installation processes of CCTV, it provides a symp-
tomatic example of the role of experimentation in the setting up of the system.
Furthermore, with the cameras lying literally in the centre of the circle of
assembled key players in the development of the system (amongst which have
been present not only the airport police but also the airport’s technical service
and the camera supply company), the example also powerfully reiterates the
nature of airport security governance as a process of interacting forms of
expertise, security conceptions, discourses and practices, which are fusing,
blending and connecting momentarily around specific projects.
Returning more specifically to the question of the mediating role of the
police’s experiences and practical knowledge in the development of airport
CCTV, it appears from our interviews that over time, most adaptations of the
system were actually driven by practical needs, emerging from everyday sur-
veillance practices by the police. To the police’s authority, derived from their
experience in combating crime in the airport, a second layer must thus be
added, referring to the police’s specific experiences in using CCTV. Driven by
new, practically-anchored needs to adapt and further develop the existing
CCTV system, the airport police were characterized as being very active in
trying to find new solutions to facilitate daily surveillance practices, without
however being able to change the system’s modalities on their own.
Whenever we can, we are looking for new solutions. It is always interesting
for us to know about new developments. However, on our level, we are
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neither the manager of the airport nor do we pay for the system.Therefore,
we are mainly observing. If we are interested in one particular system, we
may report to the airport management, who will then decide whether or not
to go further and get additional information about the cost etc. Perhaps, this
will lead to something, which we will be able to integrate. (Head, airport
police department)
Yet, the police’s practical experiences, as one of the main driving forces of
the system’s evolution, are not only anchored locally, but must be viewed along
with the experiences of other police departments – both nationally and inter-
nationally, both in the airport context and elsewhere – which were strongly
valorized in connection with the developments of CCTV at Geneva airport.
We pay attention to everything that’s written and discussed. [ . . . ] We’re
obviously in permanent contact with the airport police in Zurich. Zurich
Airport being much more important than Geneva, we consider that if
there’s a system with very good results in Zurich, it will also be successful in
our case. (Head, airport police control room)
Overall, it thus appears that for numerous legally and practically, locally and
nationally defined reasons, the police are playing an extremely important role
in the matter of airport surveillance. At the same time, however, the police’s
authority in the airport CCTV system is also subject to important limitations:
the police use CCTV, but do not pay for its installation or material costs; the
police know the airport environment from a security point of view, but not
from the perspective of the airport’s technical installations and configurations;
the police discover new needs to adapt and to further extend the CCTV
system, but do not know the newest technological solutions on the market. It
is to these limitations that I will turn my attention in the following.
The airport: financial power and technical expertise in the airport
Contrary to the police’s legal authority and practical legitimacy in the devel-
opments of airport CCTV, the airport management accumulates its force of
authority upon the system on a financial level. De facto, developments,
improvements or extensions of the system must be formally addressed to and
acknowledged by the airport authorities. Thus, the airport’s role is not only to
finance, facilitate and organize CCTV, but also to control and if necessary to
restrict any developments considered inaccurate or too expensive.
However, if we look more specifically at the processes, practices and rela-
tionships through which the airport CCTV system has been technically
adapted, developed and geographically extended over time, we see that in
practice, it is not so much the airport management itself but rather its technical
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service, which is playing the role of a ‘gate keeper’ for any CCTV-related
police demands. In this, the technical service’s position is defined by the tech-
nical expertise which is required to install, connect and manage the airport
CCTV system. Neither the police nor the airport authorities have the compe-
tences and abilities to deal with the complex technical configuration of the
airport, as a burgeoning socio-technical universe in constant transformation
(Pascoe 2001). In respect to the decision-making processes about airport sur-
veillance, it thus appears that competences are shared amongst the users of the
system (the police), the owner of the system (the airport management) and the
technical managers of the system (the airport’s technical service).
We are contributing a lot to the installation of the system, namely because of
our knowledge about the airport. Thanks to our experience, we know much
more than anybody else about the possibilities to install such-and-such a
camera at such-and-such a place.We can also show how to connect cameras,
which is very important for the cost estimation of the system, for there are
all the same several kilometres between different airport zones. (Senior
member of technical service at Geneva Airport)
Furthermore, the airport’s technical service plays an important role in the
relationships with external CCTV suppliers, with whom it is in direct and
permanent contact. These relationships with external business companies, as
well as the technical service’s frequent interactions with counterparts from
other airports, further contribute in strengthening its position in dealing with
CCTV. Following from this, and in addition to the already mentioned police
network, a second type of national/international network can be identified
which is strongly influencing local decisions about CCTV at Geneva
Airport.
I share information above all with technical counterparts at other places.
These exchanges are mostly informal ‘I’ve seen such-and-such a thing at
such-and-such a place, do you know this?’ ‘Yes, I know, what do you think
about it?’ There are also some people asking to see us and discuss about our
system. From time to time, we are approached to show what we have done
here. (Senior member of technical service at Geneva Airport)
From this position, the technical service is likely to both actively and pas-
sively manage and coordinate the provision of new CCTV equipment. Its
position is most active whenever it reviews and selects offers for new cameras
or technical solutions which are born of its own expertise about CCTV tech-
nologies on the market. Its position is more passive whenever it regulates
police demands which are born of pragmatic needs and associated with daily
surveillance practices. In this sense the technical service is both the product
and the producer of knowledge and practices, related to the conceptualization,
management and use of CCTV.
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The supplier and designer of the system: technical expertise in CCTV
When it comes to the application of new surveillance technologies, the role and
technical expertise of private enterprises in boosting, presenting and selling
new surveillance technologies, or supplying services to improve the already
existing system, is of crucial importance.Yet, despite some occasional glimpses
into the world of high-tech surveillance and big business (Davies 1996;Walton
2001), there is to date little empirical evidence of the increasingly important
role of private companies in providing technologically-based solutions in
matters of public safety and counter-terrorism policies. For example, very few
academics have provided critical accounts of how exactly the alliances
between users, owners and suppliers of security technologies are working on
an everyday basis or of how exactly specific features and devices of surveil-
lance are being advertised and promoted by private business companies, spe-
cializing in the instalment, use and management of surveillance technologies
(Lyon 2004; Stevens 2004). The following analysis of the private technology
supplier’s role in the developments of CCTV at GenevaAirport thus also aims
to contribute empirical evidence to this important research lacuna.
In our research, several interviews with suppliers of CCTV technology were
conducted. On this basis, and following an earlier analysis of twelve internet
sites of CCTV supply companies in Switzerland (November, Ruegg and
Klauser 2003), three categories of overlapping roles or rather ‘poles of com-
petence’ can be observed at the CCTV supply level:producers,distributors and
designers of CCTV systems.At Geneva Airport, a combination of these roles
can be examined, for example, in connection with the installation of additional
airport surveillance cameras on the occasion of the 2003 G8 Summit in Evian,
near to Geneva.The supply company of these cameras was founded in 1980 by
two experts in radio-tv electronics, one of whom agreed to be interviewed for
this research.Associated with several CCTV producers (manufacturers whose
products relate to security or surveillance systems on the market, from camera
lenses to automatic face or behaviour recognition software), the company’s
role at Geneva airport both consisted of providing the hardware and software
of the system (CCTV distributor) and providing services and expertise related
to the management and installation of the system (CCTV designer).
A closer look at the history of CCTV at Geneva Airport shows clearly that
the airport management has always had a marked preference not just to
purchase CCTV material but to buy specialized services, expertise and strong
client relationships, provided by a highly qualified designer of CCTV systems.
The airport decided to commission a considerably well-experienced
company in the field of CCTV, in order to install not just anything. From the
first presentation, we thought that these products were of a reasonable price
and of very good quality. They absolutely kept up with our needs. The
11
company which was applied by the airport showed very good references
from former installations at other places. (Ex-head, airport police and ini-
tiator of airport CCTV)
Thus, from the first installation of CCTV equipment at Geneva Interna-
tional Airport, the technical characteristics and positions of the cameras have
not only been discussed between police and airport representatives but have
also been largely influenced by the experiences and technical expertise of
private CCTV suppliers.
When we first meet with suppliers, we may speak about some specific issues
of our project.This may then result in a second phase of negotiations. In this
case, the supplier might tell us ‘I can do what you want but this will cost you
four times as much as another solution, which still satisfies 80 per cent of
your needs’. This level of negotiation not only typically runs into collabora-
tion with the supplier, whose expertise is bigger than ours, but also includes
the final user of the material. To rely on the supplier’s experience is very
important for us. (Senior member of technical service at Geneva Airport)
These comments strongly reflect the existing interdependences between the
police’s practical knowledge and experiences in dealing with everyday security
and surveillance issues, the technical service’s expertise in the socio-technical
configurations of the airport and the CCTV designer’s expertise in surveil-
lance technology.
The airport police want us to evaluate the CCTV system in order to improve
its performance, let’s say. [ . . . ] On the level of the cameras’ vision, we are
more or less doing what we want. It is rather on the level of the existing
networks for the transport of CCTV images that we need somebody else.We
generally do not touch these networks. (CCTV supplier at GenevaAirport)
Regarding the supplier’s technical expertise in specific surveillance devices,
and its resulting importance in the fabrication of technologically-based secu-
rity governance more generally, we also see a third national/international
network (of expertise in surveillance technologies) whose role in local deci-
sions in surveillance matters cannot be underestimated.
Besides organizing a lot of exhibitions, we are ourselves visiting a lot of
international fairs. There are exhibitions in Germany, in Birmingham in the
UK, in the US, in Japan . . . That’s how we discover new products. [ . . . ] We
need a lot of time to discover and learn to handle new products, for every
new solution, one has yet to know how to make it work. (CCTV supplier at
Geneva Airport)
On the one hand, police and airport representatives repeatedly underlined
the high value of CCTV designers’ services, in order to further develop and
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improve the system’s performance. Furthermore, contacts and exchanges with
suppliers of surveillance technologies were described as an important source
of information in order to be kept up-to-date with newly available surveillance
technologies on the market. On the other hand, however, information from
CCTV suppliers was characterized as remaining on a very general, technical
level without being directly related to the local characteristics of the airport,
which were largely unknown and ignored by these companies. Suppliers of
surveillance technologies were often said to travel from door-to-door, present-
ing and selling more or less standardized solutions for supposedly similar
security threats.
Recently, somebody came here from a security specialist in Paris, who’s
representing several manufacturers of CCTV equipments, in order to
present two new camera systems.This person is selling door-to-door a whole
series of establishments. In the morning, he was at the airport, in the after-
noon, he was meeting somewhere else. He organizes presentations
everywhere. (Head, airport police control room)
Potential clients are thereby defined not in relation to any locally-anchored
social, cultural or legal specificities, but by the predefined and standardized
equation: specific type of space = specific range of possible applications of
surveillance technologies. In other words, ambulant, de-territorialized security
professionals are trying to present and sell new technical equipment not
because Geneva International Airport would present any specific circum-
stances or risks, but simply because it is an airport. This approach to risk not
only contributes to the standardization of technically-based responses to risks
in places with similar functions, but also pushes forward the development of
new international pressures and ‘established’ security models (‘how to deal
with risks in the airport sector’), which are increasingly influencing local
decisions. This claim can be further confirmed by looking at the interviewed
supplier company’s quest for responsibility and autonomy in designing ‘its’
own CCTV system.
Good clients have confidence in us, they are correct in business matters. Bad
clients only want to find the cheapest solution. In security matters, the
cheapest solution is always too expensive if it doesn’t work well. [ . . . ]
Fortunately, I can do without these bad clients. But we had to manage our
company in this sense. (CCTV supplier at Geneva Airport)
Surveillance, in this sense, tends to become a commodity which is above all
distributed by market forces (Garland 1996) and driven by commercial inter-
ests that are surrounding and feeding off the contemporary co-production of
security governance between public-private interests. In this, we can follow
Holden’s and Iveson’s analysis of the
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‘nomadic army’ wandering the planet in search of consultancy fees and
places to save, ‘parachuting in’ to localities with plans and designs and then
moving on to the next place – almost as if they float free without any
connection to any kind of territory [ . . . ] Most importantly, it is not their
localness that gives them legitimacy, it is their expertise. This is in stark
contrast to the construction of citizenship practice as neighbourhood
participation. Instead, they participate through the local and trade in their
designs on the urban. (Holden and Iveson 2003: 66)
Conclusions
The paper has provided a series of empirically-based insights into the inter-
acting sources of authority and domains of expertise in the planning, setting up
and developments of CCTV at Geneva International Airport: the airport
police’s legal authority (1) and practical experiences in airport security and
surveillance (2), the airport management’s financially grounded authority in
the camera system (3), the airport technical service’s expertise in the complex
configurations of the airport environment (4), as well as the system supplier
and designer’s technical expertise in the employed surveillance devices (5).To
this list, in view of the described post 9/11 increase in the pressures upon
airport security, the role of national or international regulatory bodies – such
as the Swiss Federal Office of Civil Aviation – could also be added (6),
although strictly speaking its role appeared to be largely absent in the
setting-up of airport CCTV.
On this basis, the paper not only reiterates the fundamental need to con-
ceptualize security governance to be constantly ‘in the making’ (Latour 1987),
i.e. to consist of a myriad of micro-scale projects, negotiations and decisions
between various actors, whose positions are defined by multiple, mutually
interdependent domains of expertise. My analysis also provides a much
needed account of the growing functional fragmentation of authority in con-
temporary modes of governance, which has been described repeatedly – yet
often in rather general terms – by a wide body of literature (e.g.Cutler,Haufler
and Porter 1999; Lipschutz 1999: 264).
By many authors, the fragmentation of authority in contemporary security
governance has been related to the expanding role of private business com-
panies in security matters.While this development can be observed on various
grounds and for various reasons (e.g. Wood and Dupont 2006; Rigakos 2002),
the discussed example of airport CCTV surveillance above all points towards
the technical expertise required to manage the growing complexity of high-
tech surveillance systems, which is likely to give the authority of private spe-
cialists more weight. In the case at hand, it indeed appears that there has been
a gradual transfer of authority from the users of the system (the police) via the
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owner (the airport authority) and technical manager (the airport’s technical
service) to the external designer and seller of the system. Furthermore, the
explored case study indicates that all these actors are sustained by different
national/international networks – whose role for local decisions in surveillance
matters cannot be underestimated – and driven by various, more or less com-
mercially motivated objectives: from the police’s and airport management’s
coalition of interest in the airport as both a secure national entrance gate and
as a commercially attractive shopping zone, to the CCTV supplier’s business
interests in selling security technologies.
Of course, many particularities from the explored case study might differ in
other airports, in other national contexts or in connection with other means of
surveillance. Case by case, surveillance schemes are varying significantly in
terms of the involved actors, strategies, interests, instruments etc., in which
regard the role of legal regulations must be considered to be of major impor-
tance (Gras 2004). Yet, and in accordance with the growing literature on
security governance, it may be asserted with reasonable confidence that the
provided insights into the fragmentation and privatization of authority in the
installation and developments of CCTV surveillance at Geneva Airport are
likely to be of more general, hence exemplary value. By way of conclusion, it
is worth pointing towards two general sets of issues, which are arising from the
almost ‘natural’, yet largely unquestioned increase of public–private inter-
dependences in contemporary security governance.
A first series of issues at stake is related to the question of how exactly the
increasing weight and scale of private authority in matters of public safety
might in fact change the very ways of dealing with contemporary security
issues. In this respect, the example of CCTV surveillance at Geneva Airport
has shown that the required technical expertise confers to private ‘distributors’
and ‘designers’ of surveillance systems a unique ‘capacity to get things done
without the legal competence to command that they be done’ (Czempiel 1992:
250): from the first installation of CCTV equipment at Geneva International
Airport, technical characteristics, the cameras’ positions as well as their loca-
tion in the airport have not only been discussed between police and airport
representatives but have also been largely influenced by the experiences and
technical expertise of the chosen private CCTV supplier. Yet, the paper has
also shown that CCTV suppliers are themselves firmly embedded in interna-
tional networks of expertise, from which they learn about the newest technical
solutions in security matters. Designers and distributors of surveillance
systems must thus be understood not only as the producer, but also as the
product of new technological challenges and trends in contemporary security
governance.
In addition, interviewees repeatedly emphasized the widespread procedures
of ‘ambulant sellers’, travelling from place to place in order to advertise and
present standardized solutions for supposedly similar security threats.
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Although such companies are in most cases not explicitly involved in the
setting up and developments of existing surveillance systems at Geneva
Airport, they implicitly shape potential future demands by promoting the
latest, internationally ‘established’ security solutions.
Looking at current trends towards the ever more complex assemblage of
various forms and functions of surveillance (e.g. Haggerty and Ericson 2000;
Graham 2004), there is indeed good reason to assume that the technical
expertise of private business companies is likely to become ever more impor-
tant in future years. Private ‘knowledge brokers’ in security governance
(Ericson 1994) might not only tend to complement – but to truly challenge –
the police’s traditional position in security matters. It is thus of fundamental
importance to further investigate the wider socio-political effects of these
developments and to critically reflect upon the potential impacts of the secu-
rity business on the fate of individuals and societies.
Secondly, investigating the growing fragmentation and privatization of secu-
rity governance is not only of importance in order to study the role and impact
of private interests and expertise within contemporary, technically-based sur-
veillance strategies, but also to critically address a series of legal regulatory
issues in contemporary security governance. At Geneva Airport, the only
existing legal notice on airport CCTV was established in 1997, prescribing a
series of general conditions for the use of the camera system (Etat de Genève
1997).Yet, the CCTV system’s proportionality has never been truly evaluated
nor has the original legal notice ever been amended, despite the important
developments and technical adaptations of the system. As one of our inter-
viewees has put it:
We’ve informed the general public about CCTV. But we haven’t been
concerned much more with the legality of CCTV or with any particular
precautions to take. I’d say we’re working really in response to the occurring
reactions. We’re a bit reactive in this domain . . . There wasn’t any formal
complaint so far, therefore, we’ll continue like this. (Senior member, tech-
nical service at Geneva Airport)
In addition, it is important to remember that from the first installation of the
cameras, the developments of CCTV surveillance at Geneva Airport were
mediated by an informal coalition of interests rather than by formalized terms
of collaboration. Both the partnership between the airport management and
the airport police, and the almost ‘natural’ engagement of various specialists in
the setting up and development of the system, remained largely unquestioned
and unregulated.
From the perspective of the main regulatory challenges in contemporary,
security-related ‘techno-politics’ (Mitchell 2002: 43), this lack of explicit legal
regulation is rich in meaning, for it appears strongly that in practice – within
the complex interactions between various actors, interests, strategies and
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domains of expertise – the legally significant question ‘which party is con-
cerned?’ seems ever more difficult to answer. The question ‘how and to what
ends surveillance systems are set up, adjusted and further developed’ is hardly
any easier to answer because, again, the Geneva case study points out that it is
hardly possible to clearly separate the great number of socio-technological
mediations through which daily surveillance practices are co-produced and
co-developed between public and private interests. Consequently, the growing
multiplicity and complexity of technically-based surveillance strategies makes
it ever more difficult to hold the various public and private actors, which are
involved in specific surveillance projects, truly accountable (e.g. Cutler,
Haufler and Porter 1999: ix–x).
Given the rapidly growing market of new communication and surveillance
technologies world-wide, there is thus a desperate need to move beyond
generalized and deterministic discourses about the role of surveillance to ‘pave
the way for a better future’ (Videotronic AG 2003), and to look in rich
empirical detail at the complex ways in which different surveillance measures
are being promoted, sold, installed, further developed and regulated. Even if
the lack of enquiry in this research field is somewhat understandable, given the
confidentiality of information about security operations especially in the
airport context, questioning these issues is long overdue.
(Date accepted: January 2009)
Notes
1. This article develops upon empirical
results from the research project ‘Vidéosur-
veillance et risques dans l’espace à usage
public: représentations des risques, régula-
tion sociale et liberté de mouvement’,
financed by the Swiss National Science
Foundation (Ruegg et al. 2006). This
research has been conducted by Jean Ruegg,
Valérie November, Francisco Klauser, and
Alexandra Felder (social sciences) and by
Alexandre Flückiger, Laurence Greco and
Laurent Pierroz (legal research group).
2. All quotations are translated from
French to English by the author.
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